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life in Canton city (see Colonial Office letter in F 6207). Mr. Fletcher found that the strikers insisted on discussing political questions, but that the Canton authorities (ie. Wang Ching-wei, Chairman of Council of Government, Sung Tsz-mail, C. C. Wu and Fu Ping-ch'ang) were doing their best to prevent this; they were. however, afraid of coercing the strikers, because coercion would result in their own overthrow (Hong Kong telegram in F. 6147). On the 23rd December Mr. Fletcher reported that the Canton authorities guaranteed that the strikers would abandon political claims if the strike pay question were satisfactorily settled (Canton telegram No. 28). On the 30th December a delegation of Chinese merchants left Hong Kong for Canton to negotiate payment (Colonial Office letter in F. 21). But on the 4th January the Governor of Hong Kong telegraphed that their mission had been a complete failure. The chief offender was C. C. Wu, who, contrary to the under- standing reached with Hong Kong, prevented the delegation from even initiating negotiations with the strike committee. They were told (Canton telegram No. 1 of the 7th January) that political demands were paramount and must be discussed by the Hong Kong Government with the strikers direct :-
L
C. C. Wu defines the matter as not a bargain for compensation, but a political and patriotic contest with Great Britain in general and Hong Kong in particular."
In a telegram, dated the 4th January, the Governor of Hong Kong thus sums up the situation (letter from Colonial Office in F. 102):
This shows clearly that not only has the boycott the support of the present Canton Government, but that the latter only wishes to end it on terms humiliating to Great Britain.* Acceptance of such terms would, of course, react still more unfavourably on British interests in China than the present boycott. No settlement can now be anticipated before the Chinese New Year, the 13th February. I shall do my best to mitigate financial situation by use of trade loan, but I fear that it is likely to become increasingly grave. Neither I nor Executive Council, who concur in my view, can see any solution but to hold out until either lapse of time and the increasing inconvenience to the Canton authorities of tolerating an imperium in imperio brings about the collapse of the boycott organisation, or until some hostile Chinese general overthrows the present Canton Government—a contingency which appears unlikely at present." His Majesty's consul-general's despatch No. 128 of the 7th December sheds some light which may possibly explain the apparent volte face of the Canton Government. He tells us that the Russians had supplied General Chiang and the Canton Govern ment with 10 million dollars' worth of arms and ammunition, which had hitherto been accepted as a gift, but that the Russians had strictly demanded payment when they saw that a settlement of the boycott and strike might render nugatory the efforts to ruin Hong Kong "As neither Chiang nor the Government can lay their hands on so large a sum of money, they may be forced to acquiesce and to surrender to the Bolsheviks and the strikers." At the end of December a serions brigand outrage was perpetrated in Canton city; this may have had a political implication intended to terrorise the Canton Government.
Since the failure of the negotiations we have been trying to take stock of the position, to analyse the real grievances of Canton and to find a possible remedy. In answer to our enquiry, His Majesty's consul-general replied on the 9th January (Canton telegram No. 2):-
() That there is no prospect of Chiang and the cadet army suppressing the strike committees, as had at one time been hoped. and restoring order in
Canton.
(b.) That the chances of Canton being influenced through Peking are nil,
• On the 30th January His Majesty's cousul-general, Canton, reported (telegram No. 3) that C. C. W had declared to the local chamber of commerce that the strike movement was directed against the Britis and the British Government alone; the meeting undertook to support the movement until the demands presented had been accepted in full by Hong Kong. An anti-Japanese boycott on a large scale was then course of preparation; but this appears to have been averted by the payment of a large sum of blackmail by the Japanese merchants to the strike committees.
For the views of a student leader (Nationalist, but Christian and non-Bolshevik), see Annex XV. This is a fair specimen of the genuine and patriotic, but vague and impracticable, ideas current among the Canton populace.
A trade loan for an eventual amout of £8,000,000 was arranged for by the Colonial Office at the end of September and beginning of October 1925. So far, two instalments of £600,000 each have been advanced to the Houg Kong Government.
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(c.) That the Cantonese branch of the Kuomintang are said to be ready to call off the strike if the foreign Powers will recognise them as the Central Government of China-Sir J. Jamieson thinks this idea worthy of consideration as the Kuomintang are undoubtedly determined to institute genuine reforms, as has already been practically demonstrated, and are becoming restive under Russian dictation.
(d.) That meanwhile the local deadlock can only be solved by a blockade
instituted by treaty Powers with the concurrence of Peking.
(e.) At dictation of strike committees mercantile shipping of Japan and
the United States are already treating us practically in unfriendly manner by ostracising Hong Kong.
an
(f.) Indian subjects guilty of no offence have been detained in chains for nineteen days, two British subjects have been deported from Pakhoi by picket, and it is currently stated that Great Britain is finished.
Sir J. Jamieson thinks that for the Strike Committee, abetted by the Government, to arrogate to itself the right to dictate revision of the constitution of a British colony by insisting that they be entitled to secure their representation on the Legislative Council is an insult, not having any reason historically, especially as, in their own country, such a system nowhere prevails. He warns us that another general strike in Hong Kong as an attempt to force the hands of the Government is contemplated.
Sir R. Macleay telegraphed on the 9th January (Peking telegram No. 13) that he had great difficulty in forming a clear opinion of the Canton situation, as he never received any information. either official or private, from the Hong Kong Government, and was therefore in complete ignorance of the views of the Governor. He gathered that the situation was still entirely in the hands of the Strike Committee, which the local Government, acting under Bolshevik pressure, seemed to be either unable or unwilling to control. He thought that there was no personal animus against Sir J. Jamieson at Canton, and that he had succeeded in maintaining contact with the Government there by interviews between the vice-consul and the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. He (Commissioner for Foreign Affairs) is, however, only a post office between the consular body and the Strike Committee the de facto Government of Canton
Difficulties involved in keeping in touch with forces controlling the situation in Canton are corroborated from other sources, notably the United States Legation, whose consul-general has made constant attempts to interview members of Canton Government, and who complains bitterly that he is constantly being either put off or hoodwinked and can find out nothing of what is going on.
At a conference held on the 13th January, the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir J. Jamieson, Admiral Sinclair and General Luard agreed that there was no hethod by which the boycott could be brought to an end, except by holding out until either the attacks of some hostile general or internal disruptions brought about the downfall of the present Canton Government.
A further attempt to find a way out of our difficulties was made on the occasion of the visit to Hong Kong of Mr. O'Malley, the new counsellor to His Majesty's Legation at Peking. A discussion was held between him and the four authorities mentioned in the last paragraph on the 25th January (see Hong Kong telegram in Annex XVII), At this meeting it was the unanimous opinion that: (1) the anti-British boycott was mainly attributable to the Red Russians at Canton; (2) if the existing situation were to be relieved it was essential that they should be
removed.
The meeting was strongly of opinion that the British Government should take action at Moscow with a view to obtaining the removal from Kwangtung of all Bolsheviks. If this were not practicable, they could think of no other line of action except war with Canton. Unless, however, the United States. France and Japan Co-operated (and preferably other maritime Powers, too), warlike action would Jeopardise future commercial relations between Great Britain and China, and particularly between Hong Kong and Canton. If this action were not practicable. there seemed no method by which the boycott could be ended, except by holding ont until the existing Government of Canton either fell by disruption from within or was overthrown by some hostile Chinese general. At present, therefore, the trade loan was the only weapon. Even at the risk of eventual loss of money by the Govern- ment, it was necessary for the loan to be used generously for the benefit of merchants (both British and Chinese) in the colony. The meeting suggested that steps should
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